Unemployment Insurance Fraud and Optimal Monitoring
رقم التسجيلة | 22153 |
نوع المادة | مقال |
الموقع الالكتروني | https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?f=s&doi=10.1257/mac.20130255 |
المؤلفون | Fuller, David L |
العنوان | Unemployment Insurance Fraud and Optimal Monitoring |
المستخلص |
An important incentive problem for the design of unemployment insurance is the fraudulent collection of unemployment benefits by workers who are gainfully employed. We show how to efficiently use a combination of tax/subsidy and monitoring to prevent such fraud. The optimal policy monitors the unemployed at fixed intervals. Employment tax is nonmonotonic: it increases between verifications but decreases after a verification. Unemployment benefits are relatively flat between verifications but decrease sharply after a verification. Our quantitative analysis suggests that the optimal monitoring cost is 60 percent of the cost in the current US system |
المواضيع | Macroeconomics |
الواصفات | INCOME TAXUNEMPLOYMENTSEVERANCE PAYUNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE |
الأسماء المرتبطة | Ravikumar, BZhang, Yuzhe |
التعداد التاريخي | April 2015 |
العدد | 2 |
المجلد | 7 |
مؤشر المكان | pp. 249-290 |
العنوان | تاريح الادخال |
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